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SWEET AND OTHERS vs. BENNING -UD ANOTHER.
RECENT ENGLISH CASES.

Court of Common Pleas, -England. Trinity Term, 1855.
SWEET AND OTHERS VS. BENNING AND ANOTHER.'
1. By stat. 5 & 6 Viet. c. 45, s. 18, when the proprietor of any periodical work shall
employ any person to compose any article thereof, and the same shall have been
composed on the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to such proprietor,
the copyright shall be the property of such proprietor: Held, that these terms
need not be expressed, but may be implied.
2. Where an author is employed by the proprietor of a periodical work to write for
it articles on certain terms as to the price, but without any mention of the copyright, it is to be inferred that the copyright was to belong to such proprietor.
3. The defendants, who were proprietors of a periodical professing to be an
analytical digest of equity, common law, and other cases, copied verbatim the
head or marginal notes of cases from reports, the copyright of which was in the
plaintiffs, without their consent: Held to be a piracy, (Manle, J., dissentiente.)

This was an action against the proprietors of a periodical called
The Monthly Digest, for a piracy of the reports in The Jurist.
The declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were the proprietors of
The Jurist, and of the copyright of the reports therein, and that
the defendants wrongfully, and without the consent in writing of
the plaintiffs, printed for sale and sold in the Monthly Digest
copies of portions of the reports in The Jurist. The defendants
pleaded several pleas, of which the first was not guilty, and the
third was a denial that the copyright in the reports was the property of the plaintiffs. They also delivered notice of various
objections under the act, to be relied on at the trial, which it is not
necessary to set out here, but by which the defendants disputed
that The Monthly Digest was a piracy of any of the reports in
The Jurist, and that the copyright in such reports was the property of the plaintiffs. The replication took issue on the second
and third pleas, and the cause came on for trial at the first sittings
in Michaelmas Term, 1853, when a verdict was taken for the
plaintiffs, damages 40s., subject to the opinion of the Court on the
following case: The plaintiffs are law publishers and booksellers,
'16 Jurist, 543.
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and are, and have been from the time of its first publication, proprietors and publishers of the weekly periodical called The Jurist,
which has been published every week since the 14th January, 1837,
the date of its first publication. On the 80th March, 1853, the
plaintiffs caused the following entry to be made at Stationers' Hall,
which entry was proved at the trial. [The case here set out a copy
of such entry. The plaintiffs were therein described as the proprietors of the copyright of The Jurist.] The Court was to be at
liberty to refer to all or any of the numbers or volumes of The
Jurist and The Monthly Digest, and to all the books and reports
cited in the numbers of the said Monthly Digest, and complained
of, and all other law reports and digests, for any purpose necessary
to the decision of the case, and to draw all such inferences of fact
as a jury would be authorized to draw. The reports of decided
cases in The Jurist always have been supplied by gentlemen of the
bar, whose names appear at the top of those reports respectively.
These gentlemen have been and are employed by the plaintiffs for
the purpose, and they compose and furnish, with and as part of
their report, a side or head note, or compendious statement of the
decision in each case. In The Jurist the said note appears at the
head of each report. The arrangement between the plaintiffs
and these gentlemen was verbal, and to the effect that the reporters
should furnish the plaintiffs 'with reports of such cases as they
thought desirable for publication in The Jurist, upon the terms of
being paid so much per printed sheet. There was no reservation
by them of any right to publish the cases themselves, or of any
copyright in such cases, nor was it expressed between the parties
that the copyright should belong to the plaintiffs. In fact, nothing
passed between the parties upon the subject. The reports, however, have always been made exclusively for The Jurist, under the
employment before mentioned, and have always been inserted without alteration. All the cases, the piracy of which is complained
of, were duly paid for according to the terms of the employment.
The plaintiffs are the proprietors of Harrison's Digest, and they
publish annually a digest as a supplement to that work. The
plaintiffs, Stevens & Norton, are the proprietors and publishers of
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Jeremy's Digest. These digests, and other digests of a similar
nature, are compiled from the head or side notes of the reports
published during the year. No leave is asked for such publication,
or considered necessary, the plaintiffs respectively, or some of
them, being entitled to the copyright of the greater portion of the
reports referred to in such digests. The defendants are the proprietors of a periodical called The Monthly Digest, five numbers
of which accompanied the case, and which numbers had been given
in evidence at the trial. In the compilation of such digest the.
-defendants had recourse to the various publications then extant,
including The Jurist, in which the cases were reported, and in some
instances to the notes of the defendant,'Lovell, taken in court when
the cases in those instances were argued. In all the cases in which
reference was solely or first made to The Jurist, the side notes were
copied from The Jurist. The number of cases purporting to be
digested by the defendants, in the five numbers given in evidence,
ranged from three hundred to four hundred in each number, and
the number of such cases in which the side notes had been copied
from The Jurist, were as follows: - Eleven in No. 1; thirteen ini
No. 2; twenty-six in No. 3; twelve in No. 4; and thirteen in
No. 5. The questions for the opinion 6ff the Court were, first,
whether the copyright in the reports in The Jurist, or in the head
or side notes thereof, or in both, belonged to the plaintiffs; and,
secondly, if so, whether the publication in the Monthly Digest of
the said head or side notes was or was not a piracy of the plaintiffs'
said copyright. .If the opinion of the Court should be in favor of
the plaintiffs upon the points both of copyright and piracy, the
verdict entered for the plaintiffs for 40s. was to stand, with the
certificate given at the trial, to entitle the plaintiffs to costs. If
not, the verdict was to be set aside, and a nonsuit entered.
After argument by Lush, (June 5,) (Byles, Serjt., was with him,)
for the plaintiffs, and
Butt, Q. C., (P. Burke with him,) for the defendants,
JERVIS, C. J.-We are clearly of opinion that the copyright is
the property of the plaintiffs, but we wish to consider the question
of piracy. air.adv. vult.
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There being a difference of opinion among the learned judges,
the following judgments were now (June 8) delivered:JEnViS, C. J. -In this case, which was argued the other day,
and in which the Court took time to consider one of the points,
there were two questions, first, whether the plaintiffs had a property in the copyright, under the 5 & 6 Viet. c. 45, s. 18; and,
sceondly, assuming that they had that right, whether there was a
piracy, so as to give them a right to maintain an action. In the
course of the argument, I intimated the opinion of the Court that
the plaintiffs had a copyright within the meaning of the eighteenth
section; and on consideration, I now entertain that opinion;
because, where the proprietor of a periodical employs a gentleman
to write expressly for that periodical, of necessity it is implied that
the copyright of the article written expressly for that periodical,
and paid for by such proprietor of the periodical, should be the
property of such proprietor ; otherwise it might be that the author,
the day after the publication of the periodical, might publish his
works in a separate form, and there would be no property, or
benefit, or corresponding return to the original publisher for the
payment made to the author. I think, and the rest of the Court
concur in that opinion, that there is an implied condition, undertaking, or arrangement between the parties, that the gentleman
employed under those circumstances writes for the publisher and
proprietor of the periodical, who acquires a copyright in the article
so written and published. The question of 'piracy was one that at
the time seemed to the Court a more difficult one, and on which I
regret there is still not an unanimous opinion; but, upon the best
consideration I can give to the case, it seems to me that there was
a piracy on which the action may be founded. It is difficult to
lay down a general rule upon this subject; and I do not adopt or
subscribe to the proposition propounded by Mr. Lush, that the
printing of every portion of a work would be the foundation of an
action. I think it is a question of degree, which must be varied by
the different circumstances of each case. in this case there has
been, I think, an abuse of the fair right of extract or comment,
and, in truth, a republication or reprint of a composition, the pro-
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perty in which was in the plaintiffs. The work from which this has
been taken, The Jurist, consists of double reports of each caseone in which the reporter professes to give a detailed report of the
case, with the argument and the judgment of the Court at length;
and the other, an abstract of the case in the shape of a marginal
or head note, in which he furnishes the principle of law and a short
and summary statement of the facts; they are, in truth, two
reports-a long and a short report; and the gentleman who has
compiled this digest has taken verbatim, as the case states, the
short reports to which I have alluded. If he may be allowed to
do that, it is plain that he may take the other, viz. the lengthened
one, or he may take both; and the question is, can he, by any
different arrangement of the reports, or digest, as he calls it, take
them? In my opinion he cannot. I quite subscribe to the doctrine that a digest may be well made without subjecting the party
.making it to an action, where the author of the digest applies his
mind to the subject, and extracts from the case the principle of
law by the labor of his own brain, and so produces an original
work; but here this is merely (except the analytical arrangement,
which is a mere mechanical operation), that of cutting out the whole
of the marginal notes, or head notes, as, they are called. In my
mind, the ease referred to, of Butterworth vs. Robinson, is decisive
of this case, because, there the complaint was, that, omitting the
arguments, the party who was the alleged pirate had reprinted the
reports, including the judgment of the court; and although he had
arranged them alphabetically, under appropriate heads, for the
purpose of easy reference, it was held not to be a ground of protection, but he was held to have pirated the work of the original
author, and the Lord Chancellor granted an injunction. On these
grounds, I think, on both points, that the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover, and that our judgment must be for the plaintiffs.
MAULE, J.-With respect to the first point, whether the plaintiffs
had a property in the reports as the proprietors of the book for
which they were written, I think that the case is within the provision of the act of Parliament, which says, that if articles are
written for any periodical work, which would comprehend the
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work of the plaintiffs, and they are written by a person employed
to write for the proprietor, and upon the terms that the copyright
shall belong to such proprietor, and shall be paid for by such proprietor, the copyright therein shall be the property of such proprietor. It was urged in this case, that here it was not a contract
upon the terms that the copyright should belong to the proprietors,
because there were no express words conferring the copyright on
the proprietors. I think that although there are no express words
to be found here, when a person employs another to write a book,
or to do anything else for him, it is to be inferred from that, if
there is nothing to show the contrary, that such a writing or work
is produced and done by the person so employed, on the terms
that it shall belong to the employer. I think, therefore, that the.
plaintiffs in this case, as proprietors of The Jurist, can maintain
the action for a piracy of the work; but, with respect to the act
complained of as a piracy, I do not so clearly concur in what my
Lord Chief Justice has expressed, and what I understand is the
opinion of the other learned judges who will pronounce their
opinions after me. It is not very wonderful that there should be
some difference of opinion upon such a subject, because it is hardly
so much a matter of kind as a matter of degree. It is difficult to
draw a line where the act is only a question of quantity, but it is
more easy to draw the line where the question is, whether the thing
is colorable, and so unlawful. In this case the inclination of my
opinion is, that this is a different work, and made with a different
*object, and with a different result, from the work of the plaintiffs.
It may be that some persons may be able to dispense with, or may
be induced to dispense with, the work of the plaintiffs, by purchasing or.using that of the defendants, though a very imperfect
substitute for it; and I should doubt whether, in any case, it would
enable a person to dispense with the plaintiffs' reports when he
really wanted them. Probably it may enable persons to -buy
more cheaply the means of finding out what had been decided by
the courts, without going to the expense of.buying the reports in
extenso. When, however, a report is known to exist that may
have some probable application to a case, then recourse, I should
44
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think, would betordinarily had to the report itself at length; and
thus it 'may induce persons to buy the report itself, or have
recourse to it in the libraries of institutions, or combinations of
persons. But I think its having that effect is no argument in
favor. of this being a piracy, but rather the contrary, because it
seems to do a something which is not required by persons who
want to use those reports. Then it is said, and so my Lord Chief
Justice considers, that these marginal notes constitute anbther
report. I do not think that that is the case; for though marginal
notes in some instances do constitute another report, those are not
the best marginal notes, and the reporter has recourse to them
when he cannot give what I consider the more legitimate marginal
note, which is not a different report of the circumstances of the
case, and a statement of the conclusions drawn from them, but a
statement of the principle or doctrine of law which is considered to
be established by the case at length, without stating at all how it
arises. In no sense is it, or is it like, a report; and that takes
away what was pressed upon us in the argument - the idea, such
as it is, of there being in these cases a double report. They are
not, in my opinion, double reports; but they are what they are marginal notes. In some respects they are occasionally an abridgment of the reports; that is, when the reporter is unable to extract
some very clear doctrine of law capable of being stated conveniently
in an abstract, he then relates all the circumstances of the case,
and says: "If A demises to B by a certain instrument, and afterwards B dies, and makes a will in such and such terms," and so
forth. Such a marginal note is no doubt another report; but that
is not the usual style of a marginal note. Well, then, it is true
that the very words of these marginal or head notes, and the head
notes of a considerable number of other reports that are published
during the month, are contained in this publication of the defendants. Now, it is agreed that it is not every verbatim extract that
is the subject of an action of piracy. It will depend upon the
proportion the verbatim extract bears to the whole work. Nobody
denies that the mere length of these extracts is not such as to
make it the

ubject of a piracy in that respect.

Now, it must be
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taken, I conceive, in this action, that the plaintiffs are the only
persons who complaih of what the defendants have done. What
the defendants have done is this - they have devised, or adopted
from somebody else, a certain scheme of distribution of the doctrines of law which are promulgated by the courts within the last
month, and of putting them into such an order or arrangement as
affords convenience to the profession, and those who have occasion
to use the law books, in inquiring into questions of law. The
order and arrangement the plaintiffs had no right to complain of,
as that is not their own; and according to that order and arrangement the defendants have distributed a considerable quantity of
matter containing such legal propositions, of which by far the
larger part is what the defendants are entitled, under some circumstances, to be considered the owners. Now, certainly, under that state
of things, it seems to me that the defendants have madb a book differing altogether from the plaintiffs' book, and effecting a different
purpose from the plaintiffs' book. I conceive, therefore, they have
not, in the sense in which it is unlawful, taken any part from the
plaintiffs' book, but that they have dealt no otherwise with it than
a person does who, to support some argument or view of his own,
makes extracts from the book of another person, without any
intention of evading the right of the person to publish the whole
or a part of it. As I said before, I have had some difficulty in
drawing the line, and very likely I have not taken the right side.
If the case had been of sufficient importance, I should have desired
more time to be taken to have further considered it; to revise my
opinion; and certainly to express more fully and clearly what are
the reasons that induce me to dbme to my present conclusion.
CRESSWELL, J.-With respect to the first point, it is unnecessary
for me to add anything to what has fallen from my Lord, with
whom I agree; and as to the second point, I agree with my
Brother Alaule that it is difficult to draw the line in all cases,
between that which may be called an extract for the purpose of,
comment, or for the purpose of illustration, and that which is taken
for a mere piracy; but it seems to me that the plaintiffs are on the
right side of the line in this. case. This portion of the plaintiffs'
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work is taken, not for the purpose of illustrating anything, but for
the purpose of making it the subject-matter of sale in itself, and
for selling it for itself, though it is sold together with other things
that are taken from other books. That seems to me to place it on
the side of the line the plaintiffs contend for, and that therefore
they are entitled to treat it as a piracy. Therefore I think the
judgment must be in favor of the plaintiffs.
CROWDER, J.II have arrived at an opinion similar to that of
my Lord and my Brother Cresswell, after much difficulty and.
doubt; indeed, during the argument, I own that I entertained con"siderable doubts upon both points, both as to whether the plaintiffs
'had a property in the work, and as to whether this was a case of
piracy; because, looking to the language of the eighteenth section,
in which it is said that in order to obtain a property in the composition, the proprietor of the periodical, (who is in the situation of
the plaintiffs,) employing others to write for him, must employ
them on the terms that the copyright therein shall belong to such
proprietor; and looking to the language of this case, where it
appears that there was a verbal agreement between the plaintiffs
and the proprietors as to the terms of payment, and that nothing
was said of any other terms; however, on carefully considering the
nature and the whole extent of this section, it would seem that the
intention was, not that there should be any express stipulation as
to the terms, but that the terms might be inferred from the nature
and character of the employment; and sitting here with the powers
I have, [ have arrived at the conclusion that the inference to be
here drawn would be quite inconsistent with the nature of such
employment, if the copyright should not pass to the plaintiffs.
Upon the second point I had entertained much more doubt, and
still, in delivering my opinion, I must do so with very considerable
doubt, particularly as my Brother Maule has expressed himself to
be of a contrary opinion; the difficulty I have had being, that it
certainly is not a publication, upon the part of the defendants,
with the same object or result, or with any intention, as it seems
to me, to interfere with the property of the plaintiffs. Looking to
the nature of the two publications, I think it fair to arrive at that

SWEET AND OTHERS vs. DENNING AND ANOTHER.

conclusion. The question is, whether, it not being with the same
object, and having a different result, and being without any intention to injure the plaintiffs, it is a piracy. But upon looking to the
act of Parliament, I think that, notwithstanding this, it amounts
to a piracy within the express provisions of the act; because the
fifteenth section of the act of Parliament, when taken with the
interpretation clause, amounts distinctly to this-that a person is
guilty of piracy who prints, or causes to be printed, for sale, any
book, the copyright in which belongs to another,, without his consent. Now, the nature of this which has been published by the
defendants you find to be clearly a part, and a considerable and
very important part, of the work of the plaintiffs. It has bee,
said in argument that there were two reports furnished-one a full
and the other an abridged report; and that if the defendants could
take the abridged report, they might also take the full one. There
is, I think, a good deal in the observations made by my Brother
Maule on that point, and I am inclined to think with him, that the
marginal note is not a second report; but that does not seem to
me at all to forward the argument as against the plaintiffs. The
note which is taken by the defendants is not a mere second report,
or an abridged report, which could be easily done, but something
that requires a still greater exertion of mind in the author, namely,
in abstracting, after careful consideration, and writing down in
concise language, the point and substance of decision, and the rule
of law that arises out of that decision. Is it, or is it not, then,
something substantial which the plaintiffs have a copyright in, and
which the defendants have sold and published for sale? It seems
to me that the object of the defendants was clearly to put together,
in a manner of their own, and for a purpose quite different from
that of the plaintiffs, a series of results of the cases that took place
during the month. Nevertheless they do extract bodily the note
which was the substance and brain of the individual who wrote for
the work. I find a difficulty in coming to this conclusion. The
book of the defendants seems undoubtedly a very good and useful
book, and one which it is proper should exist; but I feel bound to
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arrive at the conclusion, though reluctantly, that it does seem to
me to fall within the language of this act of Parliament; and
that for these reasons there must be judgment for the plaintiffs.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Court of Queen's Bench, England.
BUTCHER VS. THE LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.'

1. Carriers by railway-Delivery of luggage to passengers.
2. A railway company, as common carriers of passengers and their luggage, are
bound, on the arrival of a train at the-terminus of the journey, to deliver a passenger's.luggage into a carriage to be conveyed from their station, if required so
to do, and if such is thir usual practice.-Affirming Richards vs. The London
2
and South Coast Railway Company.
2. Therefore, where a passenger on the arrival of the train got out of the railway
carriage on to the'platform with a part of his luggage, a small hand-bag, in his
hand, which he gave to one of the company's porters to take to a cab, and the
porter lost it, the company were held liable as for a non-delivery of the bag; it
not being found by the jury that the passcngor, by taking the bag into his own
possession on the platform, had accepted that as a performance of the company's
contract to deliver, according to their usual practice, into a cab.

declaration stated, that the defendants
APRIL 16, 1855. -The
were owners of a railway for the carriage and conveyance of passengers and their luggage from Farnham station, Hampshire, to
Waterloo bridge station, London, and were common carriers for
hire in and upon the said railway; that the plaintiff became a passenger on their said railway, to be carried and conveyed from
Farnham to the Waterloo bridge station, and that the defendants,
as such common carriers, received the plaintiff and divers chattels
of the plaintiff, to wit, a carpet-bag, &c., to be safely and securely
kept and carried by the defendants as such carriers along their
railway, and at the end of their journey to be safely and securely
delivered up to the plaintiff for reasonable reward to the defendants in that behalf. Breach, that the defendants did not safely
2

24 Law Journ. C. B. 137. The arguments of counsel are omitted.
7 Com. B. Rep. 839; s. c. 18 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) C. P. 251.
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and securely carry or deliver the said chattels, but took so little
and such bad care in and about the carrying and conveying the
same, that by and through their negligence the carpet-bag was
lost.
Pleas, inter alia, not guilty, and a traverse that' the defendants
received the plaintiff with the said chattels to carry, convey and
deliver modo etformd. Issues thereon.
At the trial before Maule, J., at the last Spring Assizes at
Kingston, it appeared that the plaintiff in November last took
tickets for himself and his wife as passengers by the defendants'
railway from Farnham to the Waterloo bridge station, and that
his luggage consisted of a portmanteau, which was placed in the
luggage-van, and a small hand-bag containing money and valuable
articles worth X240, which he kept in the carriage with him. On
the arrival of the train at the Waterloo bridge station the plaintiff
got out of the carriage with the bag in his hand, and. the portmanteau was placed on the platform, and his wife sat down upon
it. One of the company's lamp-cleaners, who was dressed as a
porter, shortly afterwards came up and said to the plaintiff, "Cab,
sir ?" The plaintiff having said "Yes," the man took the bag from
the plaintiff's band, and disappeared among the rows of cabs
attending at the station, and shortly after returned to take the
portmanteau. The plaintiff inquired what he had done with the
bag, and he said he had put it on the foot-board of a cab, and took
the plaintiff to the cab, but the bag was not there, and the driver
denied that it had e,.er been put there. Search was made among
the cabs and at the station for it, but without success, and the bag
was lost. It appeared also that no persons were allowed to assist
as porters at the station but the company's servants; and that it
was usual for the porters to assist, without any gratuity being
given them for so doing, in removing passengers' luggage from
the platform to the cabs which were allowed to attend at the
station; and that as each cab left the station, a servant of the
company took the number of tbhe cab, and ascertained where it
was going to.
On this evidence the defendants' counsel contended that the
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plaintiff ought to be nonsuited, but the learned judge left the case
to the jury, and they having found a verdict for the plaintiff, he
reserved leave to the defendants to move to set the verdict aside,
and to enter a nonsuit if the Court should be of opinion that there'
was no evidence t6 support the declaration.
E. James having obtained a rule nisi accordingly,Montague Chambers and Lush now showed cause.
Bovill, in support of the rule.
JERVIS, C. J. -At
first I was strongly of opinion that this
rule ought to be made absolute, as I thought, until I heard the
ingenious way in which the case was put by Mr. Lush, that there
had been a perfect delivery to the' plaintiff, and that he had afterwards given instruction to the porter to get a cab for him, and had
made himself responsible for the safety of the bag. But I think
that is not so, and that this rule ought to be discharged. It has
"been decided in Richards vs. The London and South Coast Railway Company, that it is part of the contract by the company
that the -delivery of passenger's luggage shall be in the usual mode
in which such delivery is made by them on the arrival of the train
at their station. that is, in this case, by the porters of the company
to cabs within the station. There is no q4estion, though that may
be the usual mode of delivery, yet that a passenger may, if he
pleases, have something short of that to satisfy the contract; and
it was open to the defendants to have shown, (though they might
have' bad some difficulty in doing so with the jury) that the plaintiff,
in this instance, had accepted some delivery other than that he had
contracted for, and whether he had done so or not was a question for
the jury. This rule is to be made absolute only if my Brother Maule
ought, on the evidence at the trial, to have nonsuited the plaintiff.
Ndw, in the absence of any finding by the jury that the plaintiff, when
he stood.on the platform with thu bag in his hand, had accepted a
delivery in fulfilment of the contract short of what he was entitled
to, I cannot say, as argued by Mr. Lush, whether he intended to
do so or not, especially as it appears that he intended to have a
cab for the rest of his luggage. The further point does not arise,
whether the company would have been liable if the bag had been
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stolen from the cab before it left the station, because, if there had
been no delivery to the plaintiff when he stood with the bag in his
hand upon the platform, and that was a question of fact for the
jury, the company have not shown what became of the bag after it
was taken from the plaintiff. For aught that appears, it was never
delivered at all, and then this case is the same as Richards vs.
The London and South Coast Railway Company. This rule must,
therefore, be discharged.
CRESSWELL, J.-I
am of the same opinion. There was primd
facie evidence that the bag in this case was delivered to the company to be carried. If it was contended that that was not the case
by reason of the plaintiff taking the bag into his own custody, the
question ought to have been put to the jury. Then the question
is, did the defendants fulfil their undertaking? According to the
decision in Richards vs. The London ana South Coast Railway
Company, they were bound to deliver according to their usual
practice, that is, into a cab, if the passenger wished it. It is clear
that they did not do so in this case. There might be evidence that
the plaintiff accepted some other mode of delivery, instead of the
usual one, but the defendants did not ask to have that question left
to the jury, and they cannot now ask us to find it in their favor.
Then there is a third question, whether the plaintiff was himself
the cause of the loss, so as to excuse the company. I think that
cannot be imputed to him. He delivered the bag, not to a stranger,
but to a man wearing the livery of the company and one of their
servants, and cannot be said, therefore, to have prevented them
from perforuiing their contract.
WILLIAMS; J.-I am of the same opinion, and I think the judge
upon the evidence could not have nonsuited the plaintiff without
overruling_Richards vs. The London and South Coast Railway
Company. It is suggested, that it would be hard upon the company to make them liable for the los of this bag, if after the
lamp-cleaner had been deputed by the plaintiff as his agent to
select any cab into which to put the bag, and he had selected one
and placed the bag in it, the cabman had driven off with it. Certainly, if that was the case, it is very much to be regretted that it

